Council of Acre

Contents

The Council of Acre was a meeting of top nobles and commanders of the Second Crusade, held on 24 June 1148 O.S. near the city of Acre in what was then the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem. Attendees included Conrad III of Germany, King of the Romans; Louis VII, King of France; Baldwin III, King of Jerusalem; Melisende, Queen Jerusalem; Fulcher, Patriarch of Jerusalem; and representatives from the Knights Templar and Knights Hospitaller. Dozens of French, German, and Jerusalemite nobles, as well as some Catholic clergy, also attended. The council was ostensibly held to debate which targets the Second Crusade should attack, but in fact was held merely to confirm a decision made a month earlier to besiege the Muslim-held city of Damascus.

William of Tyre, writing more than a century after the Siege of Damascus, said the city was chosen because it was a "menace" to the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Modern historians have largely dismissed that rationale, and provide several, sometimes conflicting, reasons for why an attack on Damascus was preferred.

The Siege of Damascus failed, and the Crusader retreat led to heavy casualties.

Background

The Muslim emir of Aleppo, Imad ad-Din Zengi, overran the Crusader realm of the County of Edessa in December 1144,[1] nearly razing the city of Edessa and killing most of the realm's Christian inhabitants.[2] In response, Pope Eugene III in December 1145 called for a Second Crusade to retake the kingdom.[1]

In the fall of 1147, Conrad III of Germany and Louis VII of France each led an army across Anatolia toward the Levant.[3] Nine-tenths[4] of Conrad's army of 30,000 to 35,000 combatants[5] was wiped out by mounted Turkish archers three days out of Dorylaeum.[6] What was left of the Germany force joined the French at Lopadium,[7] but nearly all of the Germans fell ill at Ephesus and they returned to Constantinople to recuperate.[8] Louis led the French army south toward Adalia,[9] but three-fourths[10] of his 30,000 to 35,000 combatants[11] were killed when the Turks attacked the undisciplined march at Mount Cadmus.[12]

After reaching Adalia, Louis sailed to Antioch, arriving on 19 March 1148 O.S.[13] Raymond of Poitiers, ruler of the Principality of Antioch, wanted Louis to help him conquer Aleppo, Shaizar, and other nearby Muslim-held cities.[14][15] In mid-May,[16] Louis refused, wanting to go to Jerusalem as quickly as possible. He even refused to help Raymond upon his return north.[17][18]

Conrad arrived at Acre in April,[19] and after celebrating Easter there went to Jerusalem.[20]

Prior decision in Jerusalem

In May 1148,[20] Baldwin III, King of Jerusalem, held a private meeting in Jerusalem attended by Conrad, Patriarch of Jerusalem Fulcher, and representatives from the Knights Templar. The group discussed possible targets for the crusaders, and settled on Damascus.[21] Afterward, Fulcher was sent to Louis VII, who was now at Acre.[21] Historian Hans Eberhard Mayer argues that Fulcher must have informed Louis about the decision reached in Jerusalem, and likely persuaded him that it was the right choice.[22][23]

Target of the crusaders

The Council of Acre was held in Palmarea, a suburb of Acre, on 24 June 1148 O.S.[24] It was also a meeting of the High Court of Jerusalem (Haute Cour),[25] which under the constitution of the kingdom had to advise the king on issues of war.[26][27] The Council of Acre was the largest meeting of Crusader rulers ever assembled, even though there were no representatives from the Crusader kingdoms of Antioch, Edessa, or Tripoli present.[28]

No contemporary account of the Council of Acre exists, but William of Tyre, Chancellor of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and Archbishop of Tyre, writing in 1184,[29] says that each surviving Crusader kingdom "cherished the hope that through the valiant assistance of these sovereigns who were coming they might be able to enlarge their own territories and extend their boundaries immensely. All had powerful enemies whose hated cities, so near their own territories, they longed to add to their own domains."[30] When the council at Acre began, the discussions focused on enlarging the Kingdom of Jerusalem and how best to do that.[31] Various plans were proposed, the pros and cons of each fully debated, and the "unanimous" decisions reached that the Second Crusade should lay siege to the city of Damascus.[32] Damascus was chosen because it was a "great menace" to the Kingdom of Jerusalem.[32]

Historian Nicholas Morton says the other option the council considered was attacking the city of Ascalon on the coast to the west. Seizing Ascalon would significantly improve the security of the Kingdom of Jerusalem as well as give it a base from which to attack the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt.[24] If Damascus was taken, however, the Kingdom of Jerusalem would have control over the critical agricultural districts of Hauran in Syria and the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon as well as the highlands of Transjordan.[24] Moreover, Ascalon was already ringed with Crusader castles and had been blockaded for more than a decade.[33]

Reconquering the County of Edessa was apparently not discussed, as the city was almost in ruins and the Christian population now non-existent.[34]

The Council of Acre likely had no other choice than to approve Damascus as the target, given the existing support by Conrad, Baldwin, Fulcher, the Knights Templar, and Louis.[22]

Rationales

Problems confronting a siege of Damascus

The historical consensus is that attacking Damascus was "rash", "militarily indefensible",[35] and "foolish".[21]

Crusaders had never conquered a major Muslim city without first spending years attacking and subduing the surrounding countryside, and even then had done so only after a very long siege.[36] The Kingdom of Jerusalem had no castles or bases anywhere near Damascus, so the Second Crusade would have besiege a city some 60 kilometres (37 mi) inside enemy territory.[36] Historically, Crusaders were extremely adverse to campaigning deep in enemy territory.[37] The city's population of 40,000 included very few Christian citizens, and practically all the people were staunchly loyal to Seljuk empire.[38] Without a significant portion of the population in revolt against Muslim rule,[36] the Second Crusade would need an army of more than 40,000 to successfully conquer a city the size of Damascus[38] or make provision for some way of winning over the populace (neither of which it had).[39]

The Second Crusade also faced an extremely formidable enemy. Turkish light cavalry were well-suited to hit-and-run attacks and trained to be tactically flexible in the field, while Crusader armies were slow-moving and relied on heavily standardized methods of attack and defence.[38]

Baldwin III also knew that Muslim reinforcements were almost certain to arrive once the siege began. There were large numbers of Turks in the Hauran region, and they would almost certainly respond within just a few days.[37][40] Besieged cities also called for assistance from other large cities in the area.[37] The army of Nur ad-Din Zangi of Aleppo was almost certainly in a state of readiness and able to move quickly, as it was well known that the Crusaders would be campaigning that summer.[41] It had taken ad-Din only a few days to respond to Baldwin's attack on Bosra the previous year, so Baldwin knew that the Second Crusade have to face huge reinforcements within days of beginning the siege.[37]

In the past, Crusaders had almost never maintained a siege once reinforcements arrived.[37] If they had to retreat, their armies were so slow-moving that withdrawals were certain to turn into slaughters.[42]

The rationale in favor of Damascus

Damascus was a good choice for a target because holding it would reinforce the frontier of the Kingdom of Jerusalem[43] and offer a base for expansion eastward into Mesopotamia.[28] In part, Damascus may also have been chosen because Damascus and the surrounding countryside were well-known to Baldwin III, the Templars, and the Hospitallers,[36] and the city's defenses were not considered particularly strong.[33] The Kingdom of Jerusalem even had official representatives living in the city.[36]

Both King Baldwin III and the Queen Mother, Melisende, were present at the Council of Acre. Both had been with the army of Jerusalem when it engaged in its failed attack on Bosra in 1147, and Nicholas Morton argues it is difficult to believe either of them would have approved of an attack on Damascus.[44] For both of them to approve of such a plan, Morton says, there must have been a strong king with a great deal of influence in favor of it.[33] Morton concludes that Conrad III is the most logical candidate.[45] Muslim historian Ibn al-Athir, writing a century after the Second Crusade, claimed the choice of Damascus was made by Conrad,[45] and medievalist Malcolm Barber has argued al-Athir is extremely accurate.[46] Graham Loud believes Conrad was present, and even participated in, the Crusader attack on Damascus in 1126, and Conrad may have wanted to "finish the job" as a matter of pride.[47][48] Baldwin and Melisende's desire to maintain support from European monarchies almost certainly led them to support Conrad.[49]

Historians Christopher Tyerman[50] and Hans Eberhard Mayer[25] conclude that Baldwin III wanted to seize Damascus as a way of asserting his authority over Queen Mother Melisende.[51] Taking Ascalon would increase the power of Baldwin's brother, Amalric Count of Jaffa, who supported Melisende. Damascus, on the other hand, would benefit Baldwin by limiting Nur ad-Din's power.[50]

Morton dismisses the theory that Baldwin encouraged an attack on Damascus because he wanted it to fail. This theory is based on the idea that either Baldwin or Crusader commanders thought a disaster would undermine Melisende.[45] He contends that Baldwin was too pragmatic to put his army at risk merely to score political points on his mother.[49] Baldwin firmly believed that support from Europe was critical to the security of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. A rout at Damascus would put that support at risk.[49] Mayer contends Melisende would not have wanted it to fail for the same reasons.[25]

Aftermath of the council

The Siege of Damascus was disastrous. The combined Crusader force attacked the city beginning 24 July, and abandoned the effort on 28 July after news arrived that reinforcements were coming from the city of Homs.[52] Muslim archers harassed the Crusader army most of the way to Banias, exacting heavy causalities on the infantry.[52]

The Crusaders blamed each other, and there were rumors that one or more of the Crusader commanders had been bribed to give up the siege.[53]

As had been feared, Nur ad-Din used the opportunity to impose his power over Damascus, and was in personal control of the city by 1154.[54]

Participants

William of Tyre listed numerous participants at the council.

The Germans and others allied to the Holy Roman Empire included:

There were also "other noted men of high rank, whose names and titles we do not recall."[55]

From the French, participants included:

"Many other important nobles of high rank were also present...but since it would take too long to record them here, their names are intentionally omitted."[55]

From the Kingdom of Jerusalem, attendees included:

"...and many others."[55]

Others

Robert of Craon, Grand Master of the Knights Templar, and Raymond du Puy de Provence, Grand Master of the Knights Hospitaller, were also present.[28]

References

  1. 1.[1.2]Claster 2009, p. 147.
  2. 2.Phillips 2007, p. 210.
  3. 3.Schmieder & O'Doherty 2015, pp. 121–138.
  4. 4.Michaud 1900, p. 352.
  5. 5.Phillips 2007, p. 169.
  6. 6.Phillips 2007, p. 178-180.
  7. 7.Phillips 2007, p. 180.
  8. 8.Phillips 2007, p. 183.
  9. 9.Phillips 2007, pp. 198, 203.
  10. 10.Michaud 1900, p. 360.
  11. 11.France, John (2020). "Crusaders and Settlers in the East, 1096-1291: Christian Attack, Muslim Response". In Curry, Anne; Graff, David A. (eds.). The Cambridge History of War. Volume II: War and the Medieval World. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. p. 268. ISBN 9780521877152.
  12. 12.Phillips 2007, pp. 199–201.
  13. 13.Workman, H.B. (1912). "Crusades". In Hastings, James; Selbie, John A.; Gray, Louis H. (eds.). Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics. Volume IV: Confirmation—Drama. New York: C. Scribner's Sons. p. 348. OCLC 3065458.
  14. 14.Phillips 2007, pp. 207–208.
  15. 15.Antioch had been under Byzantine control until 1084. It was one of the first cities taken by the First Crusade. The crusaders had earlier promised to return the city to the Byzantine emperor, but refused to do so. Raymond of Poitiers became king of Antioch by marriage to the child princess Constance of Antioch in 1136. The Bryzantines besieged Antioch in 1137, and forced Raymond to submit. Raymond was permitted to hold the Principality of Antioch until such time as the Byzantines conquered Aleppo, Shaizar, Hama, and Homs. If they did so, Raymond would be forced to abandon Antioch for these cities. Raymond believed that if he conquered these cities without Byzantine support, the agreement of 1137 would be obviated. Additionally, Raymond had quarrelled with Joscelin II of Edessa, and had little interest in recapturing the County of Edessa for him.
  16. 16.Phillips 2007, p. 209.
  17. 17.Phillips 2007, pp. 209–210.
  18. 18.The reasons for the French king's decision have confounded historians. William of Tyre said Louis wished to fulfill his crusader vow to visit Jerusalem, and historian Jonathan Phillips notes that Louis was almost certainly aware by now that Conrad III had landed at Acre. Louis may have wished to rush south to join up with the most senior king in Europe. Philips also points out that this did not require Louis to also refuse to help once he had done so. Phillips suggests the French army's manpower losses and a lack of funds to keep his army in the field mitigated against any agreement to help Raymond. Louis may also have learned that the city of Edessa had nearly been razed and nearly all the Christians in the county killed, leaving little to fight for. Louis also had no desire to enrage Manuel I by helping Raymond.
  19. 19.Madden 2005, pp. 58–60.
  20. 20.[20.2]Phillips 2007, p. 213.
  21. 21.[21.2][21.3]Mayer 1972, p. 127.
  22. 22.[22.2]Mayer 1972, pp. 127–128.
  23. 23.Mayer reasons that Louis must have accepted the decision, which is why he then marched with his army to Jerusalem instead of attacking some other target.
  24. 24.[24.2][24.3]Morton 2020, p. 112.
  25. 25.[25.2][25.3]Mayer 1972, p. 128.
  26. 26.Prawer 1972, p. 118.
  27. 27.The Haute Cour consisted of about two dozen "nobles" (or great tenants-in-chief). The king had the sole prerogative to make treaties, declare war, and make peace, but such decisions were always taken after consultation with the Haute Cour. The king had no standing army; under feudal law, the Kingdom of Jerusalem raised its army from levies on barons and knights. For these individuals to meet the levies enthusiastically, their opinions had to be heard and faithfully considered.
  28. 28.[28.2][28.3]Carey, Allfree & Cairns 2022, p. 82.
  29. 29.Evans 1943, p. 28.
  30. 30.William of Tyre 1943, Book 17, page 182.
  31. 31.William of Tyre 1943, Book 17, pages 183, 186.
  32. 32.[32.2]William of Tyre 1943, Book 17, page 186.
  33. 33.[33.2][33.3]Morton 2020, p. 118.
  34. 34.Tyerman 2006, pp. 330–331.
  35. 35.Morton 2020, pp. 112, 117.
  36. 36.[36.2][36.3][36.4][36.5]Morton 2020, p. 114.
  37. 37.[37.2][37.3][37.4][37.5]Morton 2020, p. 116.
  38. 38.[38.2][38.3]Morton 2020, p. 115.
  39. 39.Morton 2020, pp. 114–115.
  40. 40.The argument could be made that most of these Turks had made their annual migration to the northern Jazira Region in late spring. Even so, they could be back at Damascus within a few days.
  41. 41.Phillips 2007, pp. 225–226.
  42. 42.Morton 2020, pp. 115–116.
  43. 43.Madden 2005, pp. 57–58.
  44. 44.Morton 2020, p. 117.
  45. 45.[45.2][45.3]Morton 2020, p. 119.
  46. 46.Barber 2012, p. 191.
  47. 47.Loud, Graham (2005). "Some Reflections on the Failure of the Second Crusade". Crusades. 4: 13. doi:10.1080/28327861.2005.12220415.
  48. 48.Morton notes that if Conrad was in fact the primary advocate of an attack on Damascus, it stands to reason that he would later describe the decision as "unanimous" in order to avoid being blamed for its failure.
  49. 49.[49.2][49.3]Morton 2020, p. 120.
  50. 50.[50.2]Tyerman 2006, p. 332.
  51. 51.Melisende, her husband Fulk, and her two-year-old son Baldwin III had jointly inherited the crown of the Kingdom of Jerusalem upon the death of Baldwin II in 1131. Fulk died in 1143. Since Baldwin was only 13 years old and Kings of Jerusalem came into their majority at the age of 15, Melisende became the sole ruler. Even when her regency over Baldwin ended in 1145, she still claimed the right to rule the kingdom under her father's will. She did so until 1152.
  52. 52.[52.2]Baldwin 1969, p. 510.
  53. 53.Gervers, Michael (1992). "Donations to the Hospitallers in England in the Wake of the Second Crusade". In Gervers, Michael (ed.). The Second Crusade and the Cistercians. New York: St. Martin's Press. pp. 165–166. ISBN 9780312056070.
  54. 54.Tyerman 2006, p. 333.
  55. 55.[55.2][55.3]William of Tyre 1943, Book 17, page 185.