Actus hominis
| Latin | actus hominis |
|---|---|
| Locus in Aquinas | Summa theologiae I–II, q. 1, a. 1; q. 6 |
| Branch | Moral theology |
| Controlling authority | Catechism 1731–1748; Catholic Encyclopedia, Human Acts; Thomistic synthesis |
| Doctrinal standing | Imputability follows upon free deliberate acts; the Latin contrast with actus humanus is scholastic moral theology |
| School | Thomism |
Actus hominis is, in Thomism, an act found in a human being that does not proceed from deliberate reason and will, and is therefore not a human act in the moral sense.[1]
What is in a man without being properly human
Summa theologiae I–II, question 1, article 1, distinguishes actions proper to man as man from other actions found in man. Man is master of his actions through reason and will. Those actions that proceed from a deliberate will are properly called human. If other actions are found in him, they can be called actions of a man, but not properly human actions, because they are not proper to man as man. Scratching one's beard while intent on something else is the example given in the replies.[1]
The 1913 Catholic Encyclopedia's article on human acts repeats the same contrast: acts are termed human when proper to man as man; when elicited by man but not proper to him as a rational agent, they are called acts of man. Digestion, a startled leap, a dream, and an indeliberate first movement of passion belong here in varying degrees. They have causes. They do not yet have the moral species of a chosen end.[2]
Voluntariness, knowledge, and the imperfect voluntary
Question 6 analyzes the voluntary. A voluntary act has its principle within the agent together with some knowledge of the end. Perfect knowledge of the end, including the relation of means, belongs to the rational nature and yields the perfect voluntary. Irrational animals have an imperfect voluntary by sense and estimative power. Acts of a man that lack deliberation have at most an imaginary end, not one fixed by reason, and so fall short of the perfect voluntary.[3]
Catechism 1731–1748 teaches that freedom makes man a moral subject, and that imputability can be diminished or nullified by ignorance, duress, fear, habit, and other psychological or social factors. The scholastic actus hominis is the limiting case in which the act never entered the order of deliberate will at all. Between that limit and a fully human act lie many mixed cases, such as actions from fear, which question 6 calls voluntary simply and involuntary in a certain respect.[4]
Why the distinction matters for sin and merit
Praise, blame, merit, and demerit attach to the human act. They do not attach to the beating of the heart. If every event in a body were treated as a human act, either morality would become a farce of constant guilt, or freedom would be denied in the name of compassion. The distinction therefore protects both responsibility and mercy. It also protects the sacraments of penance: one confesses human acts, not the fact of having a stomach.[5]
Conversely, not every omission of an interior act is an actus hominis. Question 6, article 3, allows voluntariness without an elicited act when one can and ought to act or to consider and does not. Negligence can be a human act. The Latin pair is not a hiding place for what we preferred not to notice. It is a scalpel for what never came before reason.
School names under a binding moral subject
The Church has not defined the phrase actus hominis. She has taught that man is a free subject, that sin is a free turning from God, and that not every bodily event is a sin. Thomism's vocabulary is the classical way of teaching those truths in the seminary. Other Catholic moralists may speak of indeliberate acts or of the pre-moral given if they do not erase imputability or invent guilt for reflexes.
Veritatis Splendor later refused a dualism that would make the 'transcendental' choice the only human act and the concrete deed a mere happening. Actus hominis is not that dualism. It is the admission that some deeds in us are not yet ours as choosers. The rest, including the object of the chosen act, remain ours before God. That is the doctrine. The Latin is the school's handle on it.[6]
References
- Back to citation occurrence 1.0 Back to citation occurrence 1.1 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I–II, question 1 — Primary treatise on man's last end, the distinction of human acts from acts of a man, and the specification of moral acts by the end.
- Back to citation Catholic Encyclopedia (1913), Human Acts — Public-domain distinction of human acts from acts of man, and of imputability as following upon deliberate self-determination.
- Back to citation Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I–II, question 6 — Primary analysis of the voluntary and involuntary, including knowledge of the end, violence, fear, concupiscence, and ignorance.
- Back to citation Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1730–1748 — Authoritative teaching on human freedom, imputability, and the responsibility of deliberate acts before God.
- Back to citation Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1749–1761 — Authoritative teaching that the morality of human acts depends on object, end, and circumstances, and that some acts are intrinsically disordered.
- Back to citation John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor — Encyclical on the moral law, the natural law, virtue, and the relation of human freedom to eternal and divine law without reducing morality to mere consensus.