Cardinal virtues
| Latin | virtutes cardinales |
|---|---|
| Locus in Aquinas | Summa theologiae I–II, q. 61 |
| Branch | Moral theology |
| Controlling authority | Catechism 1805–1809; Wisdom 8:7; Thomistic synthesis |
| Doctrinal standing | The four cardinal virtues belong to Catholic catechesis; their exact subjects and general-versus-specific analysis are Thomistic theology |
| School | Thomism |
Cardinal virtues are the four principal moral virtues—prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance—upon which the rest of the moral life turns, named from the Latin for a hinge.[1]
Four hinges of a reasonable life
The Catechism, 1805–1809, names prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance as the cardinal virtues, citing Wisdom 8:7. The 1913 Catholic Encyclopedia traces the fourfold list through Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Ambrose, and Augustine, and notes Ambrose's early use of cardinales. Summa theologiae I–II, question 61, article 1, explains why moral virtues rather than theological or merely intellectual virtues are called cardinal when we speak of human virtue simply: they imply rectitude of appetite, and prudence among the intellectual virtues shares that implication.[1]
Article 2 numbers them by formal principle and by subject. Good as defined by reason exists in the act of reason as prudence; as put into operations toward another as justice; as curbing passions that incite against reason as temperance; as strengthening against passions that withdraw from reason as fortitude. The subjects are reason, will, concupiscible appetite, and irascible appetite. The list is therefore not a pious quartet chosen for symmetry alone.[2]
General conditions and specific habits
Article 3 allows the four names to be taken as general conditions of every moral virtue—discretion, due order, restraint, firmness—or as specific virtues with determinate matter: command, right between persons, pleasures of touch, dangers of death. Aquinas prefers the second as yielding distinct habits. Article 4 then explains Gregory's saying that each requires the others: they overflow into one another, and prudence directs all, without ceasing to be distinct when taken specifically.[2]
This analysis is school theology. Catechesis may preach the four as a complete human equipment without deciding the general-versus-specific dispute. What it may not do is reduce them to temperament, or treat one as optional because another is strong. A just man who cannot face fear is unfinished. A brave man who will not render what is due is unfinished.
Relation to theological virtue and to acquired and infused sets
The theological virtues are above man as man and are not called cardinal in the same sense. They concern the end; the cardinal virtues concern the means as human. In the Thomistic account there can be acquired cardinal virtues ordered to a connatural civic good, and infused cardinal virtues ordered to the supernatural end, differing in species. Charity forms the latter. The Catechism teaches both the human cardinal virtues and the infused theological virtues without requiring the doubled cardinal set in every explanation.[3]
Article 5 of question 61 discusses Macrobius's division into social, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues. Aquinas accepts an analogical use: exemplar in God, social in civic life, perfecting in those tending to divine likeness, perfect in the blessed. That Neoplatonic ladder is theology, useful if it does not despise ordinary civic virtue or claim that the pilgrim already has the virtues of heaven without passion.[3]
What to preach and what to leave in the school
Catholic moral teaching holds four principal human virtues: prudence as guide, justice toward others, fortitude in difficulty, and temperance in pleasures, all to be elevated by grace and formed by charity. The four subjects, the overflow among the four, the acquired-infused doubling, and the Macrobian grades are Thomistic synthesis. Aeterni Patris commended this moral architecture because it treats the whole person, reason and appetite, not a disembodied will.[4][5]
Veritatis Splendor later placed virtue beside the moral object so that character and commandment not fight. The cardinal virtues are the Church's oldest short list for that peace. They are not a fifth gospel. They are the hinges. A door that does not turn on them still looks like a wall, however sincere the occupant.[6]
References
- Back to citation occurrence 1.0 Back to citation occurrence 1.1 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1803–1845 — Authoritative synthesis of human and theological virtues, their acquisition or infusion, the cardinal structure, and charity as the form of the virtues.
- Back to citation occurrence 2.0 Back to citation occurrence 2.1 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I–II, question 61 — Primary treatment of the four cardinal virtues as principal moral virtues, their subjects, and their distinction as specific habits.
- Back to citation occurrence 3.0 Back to citation occurrence 3.1 Catholic Encyclopedia (1913), Virtue — Public-domain treatment of acquired and infused virtue and of the theological virtues as having God for object, being divinely infused, and known by revelation.
- Back to citation John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor — Encyclical on the moral law, the natural law, virtue, and the relation of human freedom to eternal and divine law without reducing morality to mere consensus.
- Back to citation Catholic Encyclopedia (1913), Cardinal Virtues — Public-domain history and Thomistic account of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance as the four principal moral virtues.
- Back to citation Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris — Encyclical restoring Christian philosophy in the school of Thomas Aquinas while distinguishing that commendation from a definition of every Thomistic thesis.