Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom
| Field | Philosophical theology |
|---|---|
| Related teaching | Middle knowledge |
| Principal debate | Molinism, providence and free choice |
Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are conditional propositions about what a creature would freely do in specified circumstances. In discussions of Molinism, they are the characteristic objects of middle knowledge: God's knowledge of such free responses considered logically prior to his creative decree. Whether these propositions have determinate truth independently of that decree is disputed.[1]
“Would” and “could”
The distinction concerns a definite response, not merely a range of possible actions. For example, “If this person were in circumstances C, she would freely return the lost property” differs from “In circumstances C, she could return it.” The first specifies a choice; the second expresses a possibility. This is an illustration of the form of the proposition, not a claim that any particular person's choice is known to human observers.
The Molinist account includes circumstances that never become actual. The older scholastic vocabulary speaks of futuribilia, conditionally future events. A conditional need not describe what actually happens in order to be a subject of the debate.[2]
Place in the Molinist account
Molinists distinguish God's knowledge of necessary truths and possibilities, middle knowledge of what creatures would freely do, and knowledge of the actual world in relation to his free decree. These distinctions do not divide God into parts or imply that he learns new information. They express a logical ordering within a theological explanation of his eternal knowledge.[2]
Luis de Molina employed middle knowledge in the Concordia to explain the compatibility of providence with free cooperation. God can choose to place creatures in circumstances while knowing their responses, without the act of knowing being a coercion of those responses. Critics dispute whether this explanation adequately accounts for divine causality and for the truth of the conditionals themselves.[2]
The grounding question
One central objection asks what makes a conditional about a free choice true when the relevant circumstances never occur. If the proposed choice is not necessitated by the creature's nature and the conditional is not made true by God's decree, the critic asks what determines that the creature would choose one alternative rather than another. The objection concerns the proposed truth of the conditional, not simply whether God is omniscient.[2]
Molinist replies maintain that the absence of an actual event does not establish the absence of a truth for God to know. Molina appealed to God's perfect comprehension of the creature; later proponents have offered differing accounts of the knowledge of conditional truths. Critics contest whether these replies explain a determinate free response without either presupposing it or compromising its freedom. The dispute should not be presented as settled merely by restating either school's premises.[2]
Catholic theological status
This technical question is not itself a definition of Catholic dogma. Catholic doctrine affirms God's initiative in grace and the reality of free cooperation; Molinist and Dominican accounts dispute how these truths are to be explained together. The Roman de auxiliis proceedings ended in 1607 without a doctrinal decision selecting one of the rival systems. Permission to teach a school is not a declaration that all of its philosophical arguments are demonstratively established.[3]
See also
References
- Back to citation Alfred J. Freddoso, “Molinism”, author-hosted encyclopedia article.
- Back to citation occurrence 2.0 Back to citation occurrence 2.1 Back to citation occurrence 2.2 Back to citation occurrence 2.3 Back to citation occurrence 2.4 “Molinism”, Catholic Encyclopedia, discussion of scientia media.
- Back to citation “Congregatio de Auxiliis”, Catholic Encyclopedia.