Ipsum Esse Subsistens
| English | Subsistent being itself |
|---|---|
| Principal loci | ST I, q. 3, a. 4; q. 4, a. 2; De ente et essentia |
| Catechism | CCC 213 |
| Doctrinal standing | Divine simplicity and the Creator-creature distinction are dogma; the formula ipsum esse subsistens is Thomistic |
Ipsum Esse Subsistens is Saint Thomas Aquinas's name for God as subsistent being itself: not a being that has existence, but the simple act of existing, the source from which every creature receives a limited share of being.[1][2]
Not a being that has existence
In every creature, what the thing is and that it is are not the same. A phoenix can be defined without existing. A man exists without being existence. Thomas argues in Summa theologiae I, question 3, article 4, that in God essence and existence are identical. If they were other, God would receive existence from another, or be a composed being. Neither is compatible with a first cause. God does not have esse. He is esse, subsisting, not received into a subject.[1]
Subsistens marks the difference from a mere abstraction. Being-in-general is not God. The act of existing as a logical common is not God. Ipsum esse subsistens is the actual, personal God, whose essence is to be. The Catechism receives this when it teaches that God's very being is truth and love, and that he is the fullness of being and of every perfection. The Latin formula is school language for a confession the Church already makes in other words.[2]
Simplicity, creation, and unlikeness
Lateran IV confesses one God, a simple substance, really distinct from the world, with a greater unlikeness in every likeness. Dei Filius repeats the Creator-creature distinction. Ipsum esse subsistens is the Thomistic way of stating why those definitions hold. Creatures participate being. God does not participate. He is the unparticipated source. Pantheism fails because the world is not the act of existing itself. Dualism of two uncreated principles fails because there is one source of esse.[3][4]
De ente et essentia already draws the conclusion in an early form: if there is a being whose essence is its existence, it is unique, and every other being has existence as received. The later Summa places the same conclusion inside sacred doctrine. The formula is therefore not a rival to the Creed. It is a metaphysical gloss on 'I believe in one God, the Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth.'[5]
Names, participation, and the ways
If God is the act of existing, the divine names are not extra parts. Good, wise, and living name that one act as imitable and as known analogically. Participation means that a creature's existence is a limited likeness of the unreceived act. The five ways terminate in a first mover, first cause, necessary being, maximal being, and governor; the treatise on simplicity then shows that this first is ipsum esse. Without that step, the ways might seem to prove only a large item inside the world.
The same formula disciplines talk of grace and of the Incarnation. Grace is a created participation, not a slice of the divine essence inserted into the soul. The assumed human nature of Christ has created existence as a nature; the Person who subsists is the uncreated Word. Ipsum esse is not a solvent that erases natures. It is the reason natures can be given without God becoming them.
Formula and faith
Catholics are bound to the truths the formula protects, not to the syllables of the formula. The living God who is, who was, and who is to come may be confessed without the words ipsum esse subsistens. A metaphysician who says the syllables while treating God as being-in-general has missed Thomas. Existential Thomists of the twentieth century made the primacy of esse their banner. That retrieval is theology. It is not a new revelation.
The 1913 Catholic Encyclopedia records the identity of essence and existence in God as common Catholic teaching among the schools, while noting dispute about the real distinction in creatures. The identity in God is the safer and more defined side, because it is another way of saying simplicity. The creaturely distinction is a characteristic Thomistic thesis. Ipsum esse subsistens names the divine pole of that pair.[6]
References
- Back to citation occurrence 1.0 Back to citation occurrence 1.1 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, question 3 — Divine simplicity, including the identity of God's essence with his existence and the denial of composition in God.
- Back to citation occurrence 2.0 Back to citation occurrence 2.1 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 199–221 — Authoritative confession of the one God, his name, simplicity, fullness of being, and the identity of his essence with his existence.
- Back to citation Fourth Lateran Council, Firmiter credimus — Conciliar confession of the one Creator, the Creator-creature distinction, and the greater unlikeness in every likeness between Creator and creature.
- Back to citation First Vatican Council, Dei Filius — Dogmatic constitution on God the Creator, the natural knowability of God, the distinction and harmony of the natural and supernatural orders, and the gratuity of revelation.
- Back to citation Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia — Early treatise distinguishing essence and existence in creatures and identifying God as the simple act of existing.
- Back to citation Catholic Encyclopedia (1913), Essence and Existence — Public-domain account of the identity of essence and existence in God and of the disputed real distinction in creatures.