Privation
| Latin | Privatio; malum ut privatio boni |
|---|---|
| Treatise | Summa theologiae I, q. 48 aa. 1–3 |
| Controlling authority | Lateran IV; Catechism 309–314 |
| Doctrinal standing | God is not author of moral evil; privation analysis is classical Catholic metaphysics |
| School | Thomism |
Privation is the absence of a good that belongs to a nature, and in Thomism evil is understood as such a privation rather than as a positive nature created by God.[1]
Absence of a due good
Not every absence is a privation. A stone does not see, and that is not an evil in the stone, because sight does not belong to its nature. Blindness in an animal is a privation, because sight is due. In Summa theologiae I, question 48, article 1, Aquinas argues that evil is the absence of good, yet not every absence of good is evil, but only the absence of a good that is due. Article 3 adds that evil is not a nature, because every nature, as being, is good.[2]
The 1913 Catholic Encyclopedia article on evil states the same conclusion: evil consists not in the acquisition of anything, but in the loss or deprivation of something necessary for perfection. Pain has a positive existence as a sensation, but its evil quality lies in its disturbing effect. The perverse action of the will implies the positive element of choice, but the morally evil character is constituted by the rejection of what right reason requires.[3]
No summum malum
Because evil is privation, there is no supreme evil corresponding to God as supreme good. Dualism that would set an independent principle of evil over against God is excluded. Lateran IV confesses that God created all things, visible and invisible, and that they are good. The Catechism treats the permission of physical and moral evil within providence, without making God the author of sin. Privation analysis is the metaphysical servant of those doctrines.[4][1]
God is said to be the author of evil only in the sense that the corruption of material things is ordained as a means in the universe, and that penal evil follows as the just consequence of sin. The evil of fault, though permitted, is in no sense due to him. Its cause is the abuse of free will by angels and men. The distinction of malum naturae, culpae, and poenae is school vocabulary for that doctrinal map.
Moral evil and the will
Moral evil is the privation of due order in the voluntary act. The act, as an entity, is from God as first cause of being, as every act is. The disorder is from the deficient created will. That distinction, already used in the theology of grace, is required if God is not to be made the cause of sin. It is also required if the sinner is not to be excused as a mere patient of a dark nature.[4][5]
Question 48, article 2, argues that the perfection of the universe requires that there be inequality, and that the corruption of some things belongs to the good of others, as the lion lives by the destruction of the ass. This is not a theodicy that makes cruelty good. It is a claim that metaphysical limitation and physical corruption are not a second god. Moral evil remains a defect for which the will is responsible.[2]
Pastoral limit of a metaphysical name
Calling evil a privation does not tell the sufferer that pain is unreal. It tells the believer that evil has no creative throne, that God can bring good even out of evil, and that sin is not a substance to be bargained with. Augustine's line, received by Aquinas, that God judged it better to bring good out of evil than to suffer no evil to exist, is theology of providence, not a shrug.
The analysis is classical Catholic metaphysics, not a defined canon of the word privatio. Other faithful philosophies must still confess that God is good, that creatures are good as created, and that sin is from the creature. Thomism's service is to keep evil from being either a rival nature or a mere less-good on a sliding scale that would dissolve responsibility.
References
- Back to citation occurrence 1.0 Back to citation occurrence 1.1 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 279–314 — Authoritative doctrine of creation from nothing, divine conservation, providence, secondary causes, and the permission of evil without making God its author.
- Back to citation occurrence 2.0 Back to citation occurrence 2.1 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, question 48, articles 1–3 — Primary treatment of evil as the privation of a due good, not a positive nature created by God.
- Back to citation Catholic Encyclopedia (1913), Evil — Public-domain treatment of evil as privation of due good, with the Catholic refusal of a positive principle of evil.
- Back to citation occurrence 4.0 Back to citation occurrence 4.1 Fourth Lateran Council, Firmiter credimus — Conciliar confession of the one Creator, the Creator-creature distinction, and the greater unlikeness in every likeness between Creator and creature.
- Back to citation First Vatican Council, Dei Filius — Dogmatic constitution on God the Creator, the natural knowability of God, the distinction of the natural and supernatural orders, and the gratuity of revelation.