Justice (virtue)
| Latin | iustitia |
|---|---|
| Locus in Aquinas | Summa theologiae II–II, q. 58 |
| Branch | Moral theology |
| Controlling authority | Catechism 1807 and 1928–1948; Summa theologiae II–II, q. 58 |
| Doctrinal standing | Justice as a cardinal virtue and the demands of social justice are Catholic teaching; the scholastic definition and legal-versus-particular distinction are theology |
| School | Thomism |
Justice (virtue) is the cardinal virtue seated in the will, the constant and perpetual will to render to each one his right, essentially toward another.[1]
Rendering what is due, as a habit of the will
Summa theologiae II–II, question 58, article 1, accepts the legal definition of justice as the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right, understood as a habit specified by that act. Article 4 places it in the will, not in the intellect or in the irascible and concupiscible, because rendering what is due requires the rational appetite's relation of one thing to another. The Catechism, 1807, teaches the same core: the constant and firm will to give their due to God and neighbor.[2]
Article 2 insists that justice is essentially toward another. Equality is of one to another, not of a thing to itself. Metaphorical justice within one man, as reason commanding the appetites, is admitted as a likeness. Proper justice needs distinct supposits. This is why justice is not about the passions as its matter, as article 9 argues, but about external operations and things by which persons communicate.[1]
General or legal justice and particular justice
Articles 5–7 distinguish justice as a general virtue, called legal justice, which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good, from particular justice, which directs a man immediately to the good of another individual. Legal justice is essentially a special virtue with the common good as its object, virtually general as it commands the others, as charity is special in essence and general as form. Particular justice further divides, in the continuation of the treatise, into commutative and distributive.[1]
The mean of justice is a real mean of equality between thing and person, not only the rational mean measured by the agent's temperament, as article 10 explains. That is why restitution can be due in a determinate amount. Other moral virtues measure passions by comparison with the virtuous man. Justice measures what is due between persons. The 1913 article on the cardinal virtues already noted this scholastic shift from Plato's interior harmony to Cicero's suum cuique.[3]
Religion, social doctrine, and the common good
Rendering God his due is the virtue of religion, a potential part of justice in the Thomistic map, because we cannot achieve equality with God, yet we owe worship. Catechism 1928–1948 develops social justice: the dignity of the person, the common good, and structures that do not reduce man to an instrument. These pages are authoritative doctrine. They do not of themselves settle intramural questions about the exact relation of legal justice to modern social encyclicals, though the latter often speak Thomistic language of the common good.[4]
Justice does not replace charity. Charity loves the neighbor in God and forms the virtues. Justice remains, because love that will not pay a wage or tell the truth is not the Church's charity. Veritatis Splendor's defense of intrinsically evil acts includes injustices that no good motive can baptize. The human act of taking what is not due is evil in its genus, as question 18 had already said.[5]
Definition commended, not recanonized as a canon
The Church teaches justice as a cardinal virtue, the duty to give God and neighbor their due, and the requirements of the common good. She has not defined Ulpian's sentence as a conciliar text. Thomism's seating of justice in the will, its real mean, and its legal-particular split remain the classical Catholic analysis. Other schools may stress rights-language or the option for the poor if they do not reduce justice to procedure or to class interest.[5]
Aeterni Patris commended this jurisprudence because it treats the other as a person, not as material for the agent's self-expression. Justice requires that what is owed be paid, that truth be told, that God be worshipped, and that the common good be sought. The school's definition is the precision of those sentences. It is not a substitute for them, and it is not optional as to their substance.[6]
References
- Back to citation occurrence 1.0 Back to citation occurrence 1.1 Back to citation occurrence 1.2 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae II–II, question 58 — Primary definition of justice as the constant and perpetual will to render each one his right, seated in the will and ordered to another.
- Back to citation Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1803–1845 — Authoritative synthesis of human and theological virtues, their acquisition or infusion, the cardinal structure, and charity as the form of the virtues.
- Back to citation Catholic Encyclopedia (1913), Cardinal Virtues — Public-domain history and Thomistic account of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance as the four principal moral virtues.
- Back to citation Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1928–1948 — Authoritative teaching on social justice, the common good, and the dignity of the human person as the measure of social life.
- Back to citation occurrence 5.0 Back to citation occurrence 5.1 John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor — Encyclical on the moral law, the natural law, virtue, and the relation of human freedom to eternal and divine law without reducing morality to mere consensus.
- Back to citation Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris — Encyclical restoring Christian philosophy in the school of Thomas Aquinas while distinguishing that commendation from a definition of every Thomistic thesis.